Abstract: The author discusses what he deems are two related myths: that machinations by the CIA are the most important factor in Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq's downfall in 1953 and that Iran's brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. In reality, the CIA's impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the US did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power. Yet the narrative of American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes how many Americans understand the history of US-Iranian relations and influences how American leaders think about Iran. Correcting these misconceptions is more than a matter of correcting the history books. Getting things right would help the US develop a less self-defeating approach to the Islamic Republic today and would encourage Iranians to claim ownership of their past.