The Skeptics, edited by Steven Luper-Bibliography



Download 81.37 Kb.
Date20.04.2016
Size81.37 Kb.
#13388
The Skeptics, edited by Steven Luper—Bibliography (back to homepage)
Adler, Jonathan. 1981. “Skepticism and Universalizability.” The Journal of Philosophy 78: 143-156.

Alston, William. 1976. “Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?” Philosophical Studies 29: 287-305.

-----. 1980. “Level Confusions in Epistemology.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 135-150.

-----. 1989a. “A ‘Doxastic Practice’ Approach to Epistemology.” In Clay and Lehrer.

-----. 1989b. Epistemic Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-----. 1991. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-----. 1993a. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Anderson, J. 1983. The Architecture of Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Andre, S. 1982. “Unger’s Defense of Skepticism: New Wine in Old Bottles.” Canadian Journal

of Philosophy 12: 453-465.

Annas, Julia. and Barnes, Jonathan. 1985. The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern



Interpretations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Annis, David. 1978. “A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification.” American Philosophical



Quarterly 15: 213-219.

Aristotle. 1994. Posterior Analytics. Trans. J. Barnes, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Armstrong, D.M. 1961. Perception and the Physical World. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Armstrong, D.M. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Audi, Robert. 1988. Belief, Justification, and Knowledge. Belmont: Wadsworth.

-----. 1991. “Justification, Deductive Closure and Reasons to Believe.” Dialogue 30 77-84.

-----. 1993. The Structure of Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-----. 1994. “Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe.” Noûs 28: 419-434.

-----. 1995. “Deductive Closure, Defeasibility and Scepticism: A Reply to Feldman.” Philosophical Quarterly 45: 494-499.

Austin, J.L. 1961. “Other Minds.” In Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ayer, A.J. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

-----. 1959. Logical Positivism. London: Allen and Unwin.

-----. 1971. Language, Truth and Logic. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Bach, Kent. 1985. “A Rationale for Reliabilism.” Monist 68: 246-263.

Barker, Steven., and Achinstein, Peter. 1960. “On the New Riddle of Induction.” Philosophical Review 69: 511-522.

Barnes, Jonathan. 1982. “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist.” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 29: 1-29.

-----. 1983. “Ancient Scepticism and Causation.” In Burnyeat, ed.: 149-203.

Beauchamp, T.L., and A. Rosenberg. 1981. Hume and the Problem of Causation. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. “Mathematical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 70: 661-679.

Bender, J. 1989. Ed. The Current State of the Coherence Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Berkeley, George. 1986. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. LaSalle:

Open Court.

Black, Max. 1958. “Self-Supporting Inductive Arguments.” Journal of Philosophy 55: 718-725.

-----. 1970. Margins of Precision. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Blackburn, Simon. 1973. Reason and Prediction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bogdan, R.J. 1985. “Cognition and Epistemic Closure.” American Philosophical Quarterly 22: 55-63.

Bogen, J. 1989. “Coherentist Theories of Knowledge Don’t Apply to Enough Outside of Science and Don’t Give the Right Results.” In Bender 1989.

Boghossian, Paul. 1989. “Content and Self-Knowledge.” Philosophical Topics 17: 5-26.

BonJour, Lawrence. 1976. “The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 30: 281-312.

-----. 1978. “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 1-13.

-----. 1980. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: 53-73.

-----. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bouwsma, O.K. 1949. “Descartes’ Evil Genius.” Philosophical Review. 58: 141-151.

Brown, H. 1988. “Normative Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology.” Inquiry 31: 53-78.

Brown, J. 1995. “The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access.” Analysis 55: 149-156.

Brueckner, Anthony. 1984a. Epistemic Universalizability Principles. Philosophical Studies 46: 297-305.

-----. 1984b. “Why Nozick is a Sceptic.” Mind 93: 259-265.

-----. 1985a. “Losing Track of the Sceptic.” Analysis 45: 103-104.

-----. 1985b. “Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.” Philosophical Topics 13: 89-117.

-----. 1985c. “Transmission for Knowledge Not Established.” Philosophical Quarterly 35: 193-196.

-----. 1986a. “Brains in a Vat.” Journal of Philosophy 83: 148-167.

-----. 1986b. “Charity and Skepticism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly October: 264-268.

-----. 1986c. “Review of Unger’s Philosophical Relativity.” Journal of Philosophy 83: 509-517.

-----. 1987. “Begging the Skeptic’s Question.” Philosophia 17: 523-529.

-----. 1990. “Skepticism about Knowledge of Content.” Mind 99: 447-51.

-----. 1991. “The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again.” Analysis 51: 199-205.

-----. 1992a. “Semantic Answers to Skepticism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 200-219.

-----. 1992b. “What An Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori.” Analysis 52: 111-118.

-----. 1993. “Skepticism and Externalism.” Philosophia 22: 169-171.

-----. 1994. “Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World.” Philosophical Review 103: 327-43.

-----. 1996. “Trying To Get Outside Your Own Skin.” Philosophical Topics 23: 79-111.

Burge, Tyler. 1979. “Individualism and the Mental.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.

-----. 1982. “Other Bodies.” In Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality, ed. A. Woodfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1986. “Individualism and Psychology.” Philosophical Review 95: 3-45.

-----. 1988. “Individualism and Self-Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 85: 649-63.

Burnyeat, Myles. 1979. “Conflicting Appearances.” Proceedings of the British Academy LXV: 69-111.

-----. 1980. “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?” In Schofield et al., eds., 20-53.

-----. 1982a. “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed.” Philosophical Review 90: 3-40.

-----. 1982b. “The Matter of Fact Omelette Eater.” Times Literary Supplement, October 15, 1982.

-----. 1983. ed. The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

-----. 1984. “The Sceptic in His Place and Time.” In Rorty et al., eds., 225-254.

Carnap, R. 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

-----. 1956. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

-----. 1967. The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Carrier, L.S. 1971. “An Analysis of Empirical Knowledge.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 9: 3-11.

-----. 1983. “Skepticism Disarmed.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13: 107-114.

Carroll, Lewis. 1895. “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” Mind 4: 278-280.

Cavell, Stanley. 1979. The Claim of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chappell, V.C. 1966. Ed. Hume. London: Macmillan.

Cherniak, Christopher. 1985. “Rationality and the Structure of Human Memory.” Synthese 57: 163-186.

Chisholm, Roderick. 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-----. 1977. The Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

-----. 1982. The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Christensen, D. 1993. “Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 301-321.

Clarke, Thompson. 1972. “The Legacy of Skepticism.” Journal of Philosophy 69: 754-769.

Clay, Marjorie., and Lehrer, Keith. 1989. eds. Knowledge and Skepticism. Boulder: Westview.

Coady, C.A.J. 1991. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Code, Lorraine. 1983. “Father and Son: A Case Study In Epistemic Responsibility.” Monist 66:268-282.

Cohen, Stewart. 1987. “Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards.” Synthese 73: 3-26.

-----. 1988. “How to be a Fallibilist.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91-123.

Cottingham, J.G. 1976. “The Role of the Malignant Demon.” Studia Leibnitiana 8: 257-264.

Craig, E.J. 1986-1987. “The Practical Explication of Knowledge.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 211-226.

Craig, E.J. 1987. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Craig, E. 1989. “Nozick and the Sceptic: The Thumbnail Version.” Analysis 49: 161-162.

Curley, E.M. 1978. Descartes Against the Skeptics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dancy, Jonathan. 1984. “On the Tracks of the Sceptic.” Analysis 44: 121-126.

-----. 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davidson, Donald. 1966. “Emeroses by Other Names.” In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

-----. 1977. “The Method of Truth in Metaphysics.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Morris: University of Minnesota Press.

-----. 1985. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-----. 1986a. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” In Henrich 1983..

-----. 1986b. “Empirical Content.” In Truth and Interpretation: Essays on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. E. LePore. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Davis, W. and Bender, J. 1989. “Fundamental Troubles with the Coherence Theory.” In Bender 1989.

DePaul, M. 1986. “Reflective Equilibrium and Foundationalism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 23: 59-69.

DePaul, M. 1993. Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry. London: Routledge.

DeRose, Keith. 1989. “Reid’s Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism.” Philosophical Review 98: 313-348.

-----. 1992. “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 913-929.

-----. 1995. “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” Philosophical Review 104: 1-52.

Descartes, Rene. 1628. Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

DeSousa, R. 1970. “Knowledge, Consistent Belief, and Self-Consciousness.” Journal of Philosophy 67: 66-73.

Dewey, John. 1929. The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action. New York: Minton, Balch.

Dretske, Fred. 1968. “Reasons and Consequences.” Analysis April: 28: 166-168.

-----. 1969. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

-----. 1970. “Epistemic Operators.” Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007-1023.

-----. 1971. “Conclusive Reasons.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 1-22.

-----. 1972. “Contrastive Statements.” Philosophical Review 81: 411-430.

-----. 1977. “Laws of Nature.” Philosophy of Science 44: 248-268.

-----. 1981a. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-----. 1981b. “The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 40: 363-378.

-----. 1983. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-----. 1993. “The Nature of Thought.” Philosophical Studies 70: 185-199.

Duggan, T. 1984. “Thomas Reid on Memory, Prescience and Freedom.” In Hope, ed., 32-46.

Dummett, Michael. 1973. “The Justification of Deduction.” In Truth and Other Enigmas. Duckworth.

-----. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Duckworth.

Edwards, Paul. 1949. “Russell’s Doubts about Induction.” Mind 58: 141-163.

Elgin, Catharine. 1988. “The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity.” Synthese 74: 297-311.

Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. New York: Oxford University Press.

Falvey, K., and J. Owens. 1994. “Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism.” Philosophical Review 103: 107-137.

Feigl, Herbert. 1950. “De Principiis Non Disputandum . . .?” in M. Black, ed., Philosophical Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Feldman, Richard. 1995. “In Defense of Closure.” Philosophical Quarterly 45: 487-494.

Ferreira, M.J. 1986. Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method. London: Verso.

Firth, Roderick. 1967. “The Anatomy of Certainty.” Philosophical Review 76: 3-27.

Flew, Anthony. 1961. Hume’s Philosophy of Belief. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

-----. 1986. David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fogelin, Robert. 1985. Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

-----. 1994. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foley, Richard. 1978. “Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 311-316.

-----. 1985. “What’s Wrong with Reliabilism?” Monist 68: 188-202.

-----. 1987. “Evidence as a Tracking Relation.” In Luper 1987.

-----. 1993. Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1994. “The Epistemology of Sosa.” In E. Villanueva, ed., Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

Forbes, Graham. 1984. “Nozick on Skepticism.” Philosophical Quarterly 34: 43-52.

-----. 1995a. “Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited.” Journal of Philosophy 92: 205-222.

-----. 1995b. “A Reply to Mazoué and Brueckner.” Philosophical Quarterly 35: 196-199.

Frankfurt, Harry. 1970. Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Frede, Michael. 1987. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fumerton, Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

Garrett, B.J. 1983. “Nozick on Knowledge.” Analysis 43: 181-184.

Garrett, B.J. 1984. “Nozick and Knowledge—a Rejoinder.” Analysis 44: 194-196.

Gettier, Edwin. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121-123.

Gewirth, Alan. 1941. “The Cartesian Circle.” Philosophical Review 50: 368-395.

Ginet, Carl. 1975. Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Goldman, Alan. 1988. Empirical Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Goldman, Alvin. 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Journal of Philosophy 64: 357-372.

-----. 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 771-791.

-----. 1979. “What is Justified Belief?” In Justification and Knowledge, ed. G.S. Pappas. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

-----. 1980. “The Internalist Conception of Justification.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: 27-51.

-----. 1984. “An Explanatory Analysis of Knowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 21: 101-108.

-----. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-----. 1989. “BonJour’s The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.” In Bender 1989.

-----. 1992. Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Goodman, Nelson. 1973. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

-----. 1995. “The New Riddle of Induction.” In Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gordon, D. 1984. “Knowledge, Reliable Methods, and Nozick.” Analysis 44: 30-33.

Gould, S.J. 1980. “Is a New and General Theory of Evolution Emerging?” Paleobiology.

Grayling, A.C. 1985. The Refutation of Skepticism. London: Duckworth.

Greco, J. 1990. “Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief.” Synthese 85: 245-277.

-----. 1993. “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23: 413-432.

-----. 1994. “Virtue Epistemology and the Relevance of ‘Relevant Possibility.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 32: 61-77.

-----. 2000. Putting Skeptics in Their Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hacking, Ian. 1975. The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hale, B. 1988. “Epistemic Universalizability.” Analysis 48: 78-84.

Hamlyn, D.W. 1970. The Theory of Knowledge. London: Macmillan.

Harman, Gilbert. 1965. “Inference to the Best Explanation.” Philosophical Review 74: 88-95.

-----. 1973. Thought. Princeton University Press.

-----. 1986. Change in View. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Heil, John. 1988a. “The Epistemic Route to Anti-Realism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66: 161-173.

-----. 1988b. “Privileged Access.” Mind 97: 238-251.

-----. 1992. The Nature of True Minds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hempel, Carl. 1962. “Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

-----. 1965. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation.” Philosophical Review 74: 88-95.

Henrich, Deter. 1983. ed. Kant oder Hegel. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Hill, C. 1991. Sensations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, C. 1994. “Two Cheers For Process Reliabilism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75:

12-28.


Hintikka, J. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Holland, J., Holyoak, K., Nisbett, R., et al. 1994. “Learning Inferential Rules.” In Kornblith 1994.

Hooker, M. 1973. “In Defense of the Principle for Deductibility of Justification.” Philosophical

Studies 24: 402-405.

Hookway, C. 1990b. Scepticism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Horwich, P. 1982. Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hume, David. 1739-1740. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

-----. 1748. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902.

James, William. 1956. “The Will to Believe.” In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover.

Johnsen, Bredo. 1985. “Skeptical Rearmament.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15: 507-509.

-----. 1990. “Relevant Alternatives and Demon Scepticism.” In Roth 1990.

Johnston, M. 1993. “Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism.” In Reality: Representation and Projection, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright. New York: Oxford.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and T. Amos. 1982. Eds. Judgment Under Certainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1961.

Kant, Immanuel. 1783. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Ed. L. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-

Merrill, 1950.

Kirkham, R.L. 1984. “Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 93: 501-513.

Kirwan, C. 1983. “Augustine Against the Skeptics.” In Burnyeat, ed., 105-123.

Klein, Peter. 1981. Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

-----. 1985. “The Virtue of Inconsistency.” Monist 68: 105-135.

-----. 1986. “Radical Interpretation and Radical Scepticism.” In Lepore, ed., 369-86.

-----. 1987. “On Behalf of the Skeptic.” In Luper 1987.

-----. 1995. “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.” Philosophical Topics 23: 213-236.

Kneale, William. 1949. Probability and Induction. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kornblith, Hilary. 1980. “Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory.” Journal of Philosophy 77: 597-612.

-----. 1993. Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-----. 1994. ed. Naturalizing Epistemology. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kvanvig, J. 1992. “The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind.” Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kyburg, Henry. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown: Wesleyan

University Press.

-----. 1970. “Conjunctivitis.” In Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, ed. by M. Swain. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Laudan, Larry. 1987. “Progress or Rationality: the Prospects for Normative Naturalism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 19-31.

Lehrer, Keith. 1968. “Belief and Knowledge.” Philosophical Review 77: 491-499.

-----. 1970. “Justification, Explanation, and Induction.” In Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, ed. M. Swain. Dordrecht: Reidel.

-----. 1974. Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1978. “Why Not Skepticism?” In Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. M. Swain and G. Pappas. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-----. 1986. “The Coherence Theory of Knowledge.” Philosophical Topics 14: 5-25.

-----. and T. Paxson. 1969. “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.” Journal of Philosophy 66: 225-237.

Lepore, Ernest. 1986. Ed. Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell.

Levi, I. 1967. Gambling With Truth. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-----. 1979a. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” Philosophical Review 88: 513-543.

-----. 1979c. “Scorekeeping in a Language Game.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 339-359.

-----. 1980. “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58: 239-249.

-----. 1986. “Causal Explanation.” Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1996. “Elusive Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549-567.

Lipton, P. 1991. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Locke, John. 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. P. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ludwig, K. 1992. “Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference.” Journal of Philosophical Research 17: 313-345.

Luper(-Foy), Steven. 1984a. “The Epistemic Predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian Tracking, and Skepticism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 26-48.

-----. 1984b. “What Skeptics Don’t Know Refutes Them.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65: 86-96.

-----. 1987. ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.

-----. 1987. “The Causal Indicator Analysis of Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Malcolm, Norman. 1952. “Knowledge and Belief.” Mind 51: 178-189.

-----. 1963. “The Verification Argument.” In Knowledge and Certainty. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Martin, R. 1984. “Tracking Nozick’s Sceptic: A Better Method.” Analysis 43: 28-33.

Mazoué, J.G. 1985. “Nozick on Inferential Knowledge.” Philosophical Quarterly 35: 191-193.

McDowell, John. 1992. “Putnam on Mind and Meaning.” Philosophical Topics 20: 35-48.

-----. 1996. Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McGinn, C. 1984. “The Concept of Knowledge.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 9, Causation and Causal Theories.

-----. 1986. “Radical Interpretation and Epistemology.” In Lepore, ed., 356-368.

-----. 1989. Mental Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

McGinn, M. 1989. Sense and Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell.

McKinsey, M. 1991. “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access.” Analysis 51: 9-16.

Mill, J.S. 1884. A System of Logic. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Millikan, R. 1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge:

MIT Press.

Moore, G.E. 1959. Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Moser, Paul. 1986. ed. Empirical Knowledge. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

Naess, Arne. 1968. Skepticism. New York: Humanities Press.

Neurath, Otto. 1932-1933. “Protokollsätze.” Erkenntis In A.J. Ayer, ed. 1980. Logical Positivism, trans. F. Shick. New York: The Free Press.

Newton-Smith, W. 1981. The Rationality of Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Nisbett, R., and L. Ross. 1980. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Noonan, H. 1993. “Object Dependent Thoughts.” In Mental Causation, ed. J. Heil and A. Mele. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norton, D.F. 1982. David Hume: Common Sense Moralist and Sceptical Metaphysician. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Oakley, I.T. 1976. “An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs.” American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 221-228.

Olen, J. 1977. “Knowledge, Probability, and Nomic Connections.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 15: 521-526.

Papineau, D. 1987. Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.

Pappas, George, and Swain, Marshall. 1978. Eds. Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-----. 1979. ed. Justification and Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Peacocke, Christopher. 1983. Sense and Content. New York: Oxford.

Peirce, C.S. 1931-1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Ed. P. Weiss, C. Hartshorne, and A. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Penelhum, Terence. 1983. “Skepticism and Fideism.” In Burnyeat, ed., 287-318.

Plantinga, Alvin. 1983a. “Reason and Belief in God.” In Plantinga and Wolterstorff.

Plantinga, Alvin., and Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 1983b. eds. Faith and Rationality. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

-----. 1988b. “Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function.” In J. Tomberlin, ed. Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

-----. 1993a. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1993b. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plato. 1953. Dialogues. trans. B. Jowett. Vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pollock, John. 1976. Subjunctive Reasoning. Dordrecht: Reidel.

-----. 1987. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. London: Hutchinson.

Popkin, Richard. 1964. History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, rev. ed. New York: Humanities Press.

-----. 1966. “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism.” In Chappell 1966, 53-98.

-----. 1979. History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Popper, Karl. 1972a. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.

-----. 1972b. Objective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prichard, H.A. 1950. Knowledge and Perception. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The Meaning of Meaning.” In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York: Cambridge.

-----. 1977. “Realism and Reason.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50: 483-489.

-----. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. New York: Cambridge University Press.

-----. 1982. “Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized.” Synthese 52: 3-23.

Quine, W.V.O. 1951. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” Philosophical Review 60: 20-43.

-----. 1953. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-----. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-----. 1969a. “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

-----. 1969b. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

-----. 1973. The Roots of Reference. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

-----. 1975. “The Nature of Natural Knowledge.” In S. Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1981. Theories and Things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Quinton, Anthony. 1973. The Nature of Things. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Radford, Colin. 1966. “Knowledge By Examples.” Analysis 27: 1-11.

Ramsey, F.P. 1931. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Reichenbach, Hans. 1949. The Theory of Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Reid, Thomas. 1985. The Works of Thomas Reid, 8th ed., ed. W. Hamilton. Edinburgh: James Thin.

Rescher, Nicholas. 1980. Scepticism: A Critical Reappraisal. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

Reynolds, S. 1991. “Knowing How to Believe with Justification.” Philosophical Studies 64: 273-292.

Robinson, R. 1971. “Begging the Question.” Analysis 31: 113-117.

Rorty, Amelia. 1986. Ed. Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Roth, Michael and Ross, Glenn, Eds. 1990. Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Russell, Bertrand. 1914. “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics.” In Mysticism and Logic. London: Allen and Unwin.

-----. 1948. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits. London: Allen and Unwin.

Sainsbury, M. 1988. Paradoxes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Salmon, N. 1986. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Salmon, W.C. 1957. “Should We Attempt to Justify Induction?” Philosophical Studies 8: 33-48.

Sanford, D. 1981. “Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske.” Philosophical Studies 40: 379-388.

Saunders, J.T. 1972. “Thalberg’s Challenge to Justification via Deduction.” Philosophical Studies 23: 358-364.

Savage, L.J. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. London: Chapman and Hall.

Scheffler, Israel. 1979. The Anatomy of Inquiry. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Part 3.

Schiffer, S. 1996. “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 317-333.

Schmitt, C.B. 1983. “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times.” In Burnyeat, ed., 225-251.

Schmitt, Fred. 1985. “Knowledge as Tracking?” Topoi 4: 73-80.

-----. 1992. Knowledge and Belief. London: Routledge.

Schofield, M., Burnyeat, M., and J. Barnes. 1980. Eds. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schouls, P. 1980. The Imposition of Method: A Study of Descartes and Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sedley, D. 1983. “The Motivation of Greek Scepticism.” In Burnyeat, ed., 9-29.

Sellars, Wilfred. 1963. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” In Science, Perception, and Reality. London: Routledge.

Sextus Empiricus. 1933a. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Trans. R.G. Bury. London: W. Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library.

-----. 1933b. Against the Logicians. Trans. R.G. Bury. London: W. Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library.

-----. Writings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library.

Shatz, David. 1981. “Reliability and Relevant Alternatives.” Philosophical Studies 39: 393-408.

-----. 1987. “Nozick’s Conception of Skepticism.” In Luper 1987.

Shope, Robert. 1984. “Cognitive Abilities, Conditionals, and Knowledge: A Response to Nozick.” Journal of Philosophy 81: 29-48.

Shuger, S. 1983. “Knowledge and Its Consequences.” American Philosophical Quarterly 20: 217-226.

Siegel, Harvey. 1980. “Justification, Discovery and the Naturalizing of Epistemology.” Philosophy of Science 51: 297-320.

Skyrms, Brian. 1967. “The Explication of ‘X Knows that P’.” Journal of Philosophy 64: 373-389.

Slote, Michael. 1970. Reason and Skepticism. London: Allen and Unwin.

Sorensen, Roy. 1996. “Unbeggable Questions.” Analysis 56: 51-55.

Sosa, Ernest. 1988. “Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt.” In J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

-----. 1989. “Understanding Human Knowledge in General.” In Clay 1989.

-----. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-----. 1993. “Knowledge in Perspective.” Mind 102: 199-203.

-----. 1994a. “Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68.

-----. 1994b. “Virtue Perspectivism: A Response to Foley and Fumerton.” In E. Vallanueva, ed., Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.

-----. 1996. “Postscript to Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology.” In J. Kvanvig, ed., Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Stalnaker, Robert. 1972. “Pragmatics.” In Semantics of Natural Language, ed. D. Davidson and G. Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel.

-----. 1973. “Presuppositions.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 2: 447-457.

-----. 1990. “Narrow Content.” In Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, ed. C.A. Anderson and J. Owens. Stanford: CSLI.

Steiner, M. 1975. Mathematical Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Stine, G.C. 1971. “Dretske on Knowing the Logical Consequences.” Journal of Philosophy 68: 296-299.

-----. 1976. “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.” Philosophical Studies 29: 249-261.

Stitch, Stephen. 1990. The Fragmentation of Reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Stough, C. 1969. Greek Skepticism: A Study in Epistemology. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Strawson, P.F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen.

Strawson, P.F. 1985. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. London: Methuen.

Striker, Gisela. 1983. “The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus.” In Burnyeat, ed., 95-115.

-----. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-----. 1989. “Understanding Human Knowledge in General.” In Clay 1989.

-----. 1994. “Scepticism, ‘Externalism,’ and the Goal of Epistemology.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1994: 291-307.

Stump, E. 1992. “Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17: 125-158.

Swain, Marshall. 1970. “The Consistency of Rational Belief.” In Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, ed. M. Swain. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Thalberg, I. 1974. “Is Justification Transmissible Through Deduction?” Philosophical Studies 25: 347-356.

Turing, A.M. 1950. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” In Minds and Machines, ed. A.R. Anderson.

Tymoczko, T. 1990. “Brains Don’t Lie: They Don’t Even Make Many Mistakes.” In Roth 1990.

Unger, Peter. 1968. “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 65: 157-170.

-----. 1971. “A Defense of Skepticism.” Philosophical Review 80: 198-219.

-----. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1984. Philosophical Relativity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

-----. 1986. “The Cone Model of Knowledge.” Philosophical Topics 14: 125-178.

van Cleve, James. 1979. “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle.” Philosophical Review 88: 55-91.

-----. 1984. “Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 555-567.

-----. 1985. “Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief.” Monist 68: 90-104.

van Fraassen, Bas. 1966. “Singular Terms, Truth Value Gaps, and Free Logic.” Journal of Philosophy 63: 481-495.

-----. 1968. “Presupposition, Implication, and Self Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 65: 136-151.

-----. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Vernier, P. 1976. “Thomas Reid on the Foundations of Knowledge and His Answer to Skepticism.” In Barker and Beauchamp, eds., 14-24.

Vogel, Jonathan. 1987. “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.” In Luper 1987.

----- 1990. “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.” Journal of Philosophy 87: 658-666.

----- 1990. “Are there Counter-examples to the Closure Principle?” In Roth 1990.

-----. 2000. “Reliabilism Leveled.” Journal of Philosophy, 602-623.

von Wright, G.H. 1965. The Logical Problem of Induction. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wheeler, D.D. 1970. “Processes in World Recognition.” Cognitive Psychology 1: 59-85.

Williams, Bernard. 1973. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-----. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Williams, Michael. 1977. Groundless Belief. New Haven: Yale University Press.

-----. 1986. “Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt.” In Rorty 1986, 117-139.

-----. 1988a. “Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism.” Mind 97: 415-439.

-----. 1988b. “Scepticism Without Theory.” Review of Metaphysics 41: 547-588.

-----. 1988c. “Scepticism and Charity.” Ratio 1: 176-194.

-----. 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wilson, Margaret. 1978. Descartes. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.

-----. 1967. Zettel. Oxford: Blackwell.

-----. 1977. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell.

Woolhouse, R.S. 1988. The Empiricists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Woozley, A.D. 1953. “Knowing and Not Knowing.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53: 151-172.

Wright, C. 1983. “Keeping Track of Nozick.” Analysis 43: 134-140.

-----. 1985. “Facts and Certainty.” Proceedings of the British Academy LXXI: 429-472.

-----. 1992a. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard.

-----. 1992b. “On Putnam’s Proof that We are not Brains-in-a-Vat.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 67-94.

Yourgrau, P. 1983. “Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.” Synthese 55: 175-190.

Zagzebski, Linda. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Ziff, Paul. 1984. Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Download 81.37 Kb.

Share with your friends:




The database is protected by copyright ©www.essaydocs.org 2022
send message

    Main page